Microsoft’s Seven Year Delayed Patch - The Saga Continues
You might have thought that with Microsoft’s “Patch Tuesday” fix of the seven year bug, things would be over. And in a more perfect world, they would be. Unfortunately we don’t seem to live in that more perfect world.
The problem is, according to sources like Metasploit, it ain’t over yet.
“The MS08-068 patch addresses this attack only in the case where the attacker connects back to the victim,” says Metasploit. In fact, Metasploit goes on to say, “The patch does NOT address the case where the attacker relays the connection to a third-party host that the victim has access to.”
And since this is quite possible to do, it basically means that Microsoft’s “fix” ammounts to nothing for any dedicated attacks.
So what does Microsoft have to say about it? Well, let’s take a gander over here, where Christopher Budd speaks.
Let’s see. “At a high level, the behavior that was discussed in the original SMBRelay attack is related to some of the basic behavior of the legacy NTLM protocol.“ Okay, congratulations on being able to throw acronyms around. “When this issue was first raised back in 2001, we said that we could not make changes to address this issue without negatively impacting network-based applications.“ Well … yeah. Obviously fixing the problem would mean changes to every application that uses the faulty code. It’s a lot of work. Something that should have gotten on right away, instead of being put off. But why do that when you can procrastinate?
“We did say that customers who were concerned about this issue could use SMB signing as an effective mitigation, but, the reality was that there were similar constraints that made it infeasible for customers to implement SMB signing.“ So the workaround wasn’t actually feasible. Microsoft’s own words here. “As Mark notes in his post, implementing SMB signing is still an option and one that we ultimately recommend.“ Wait, so it’s not feasible, but it’s still the option that Microsoft recommends? Even after releasing their “fix”?
“However, if you’re like me and remember the SMBRelay attack, you now have a protection option in case you can’t implement SMB signing: apply MS08-068.“ Oh, great. The MS08-068 that according to Metasploit isn’t actually a fix at all because a hacker can work around it to still execute code remotely.
So let me get this straight. Microsoft delays a fix to Windows for seven years because it would mean also fixing all of the affected networking clients. Instead of just fixing it and fixing the clients too. Their suggestion to people who are afraid of an attack by this route are to use an admittedly “infeasable” workaround. And when, so much later, Microsoft finally patches the actual security hole, they don’t fully patch it, but just one approach to it. So that hackers can still get around the patch. So your options are use a patch that doesn’t work, or use an “infeasable” workaround? And that’s after seven years!
Yep. That’s security, Microsoft style.
